It is analyzed how size differences among countries affect the benefits from climate coalitions. It is shown that size differences lead to smaller coalitions and greater benefits than coalitions among identical countries. This approach is applied to the world's largest emitters of carbon dioxide with each country valuing emission reductions according to (i) its share in world emissions, (ii) its share in world GDP, and (iii) its share of world population. The most realistic outcome is obtained in case (ii), with the EU leading in a climate coalition, with the US and Japan joining but no others, while in case (i) the US would lead, with others successively joining the higher the abatement cost, and in case (iii) only China would abate. The importance of the discount rate for dynamic stability is also considered.
INTRODUCTION
Global warming due to emissions of greenhouse gases has been on the international agenda for about 20 years. Carbon dioxide is the most important of all greenhouse gases, and hence reduction in emissions of this gas has been the top priority in climate policy. Since greenhouse gases are quickly spread throughout the atmosphere it is immaterial where they are emitted, and so reducing these emissions is a truly global problem. Comprehensive international effort is thus required for doing anything of consequence about these emissions, and the Kyoto Protocol in often criticized for not being comprehensive enough.
The literature on climate treaties has therefore been preoccupied with what it takes to achieve international treaties among many enough countries to make a difference. Much of this literature assumes a large and unspecified number of identical countries, 1 and it is generally pessimistic with regard to the possibility of reaching agreements that involve a sufficient number of sovereign states to make much of a difference (Barrett, 1994 (Barrett, , 2003 Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993) . Such agreements must be self-enforcing, which is the reason why they are so difficult to achieve; typically countries can be expected to see their interests better served by being free riders on other countries' efforts than by joining the pioneers. Yet as one looks at statistics on CO 2 emissions, one is struck by the fact that only a handful of countries are responsible for the bulk of these emissions. Table 1 shows the emissions from the largest emitters, together with total emissions. The United States, China, and the European Union are together responsible for more than half of all emissions in the world. 2 If we add the next three largest emitters, Russia, India and Japan, the share of the largest emitters rises to 70 percent. Therefore, it would take cooperation from only a handful of countries to achieve a substantial reduction in the global emissions of CO 2 . It should also help that some of the 1 Exceptions are Barrett (1997) , Botteon and Carraro (1997) , and Eyckmans and Finus (2006) . The latter two are based on empirical models. 2 For this purpose it makes sense to treat the European Union as a single country, because of its common policy on greenhouse gas emissions. It would probably make sense to add the members of the European Economic Area (Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein), but their emissions only account for tiny three pro mille of the global emissions and so are inconsequential.
countries involved appear to be among those which could be the major losers from a warmer climate. The western part of the United States is plagued by drought and is predicted to become drier still. Parts of China are also arid, and the water supplies to parts of India could be threatened by meltdown of Himalaya's glaciers.
That countries are large in the sense that they emit a large volume of CO 2 is not enough to make them sufficiently interested in reducing these emissions; in order that size promote climate cooperation it must also be the case that these countries derive large benefits from doing so. As will be shown below, if some countries are large in the sense of deriving large benefits from reducing greenhouse gases while not emitting much themselves, size differences will do little or nothing to promote climate cooperation.
The economic literature on international environmental treaties is large.
3 Different strands of this literature may be identified along various dimensions. One concerns the way abatement is modeled. Earlier contributions used non-linear cost functions for abatement and derived optimal abatement levels with and without cooperation (e.g., Barrett, 1994 Barrett, , 1997 Botteon and Carraro, 1997) . With this approach it was found that climate coalitions would consist only of two or three countries and that cooperation would not achieve a great deal. This conclusion has recently been challenged by de Zeeuw (2008) who finds much larger stable coalitions, relying on the concept of farsighted equilibrium.
Some later papers have used linear cost functions which result in an "either or" choice; without cooperation no abatement would take place, while those who cooperate would eliminate their emissions. Countries have the choice of joining a coalition which cuts all emissions and will do so if the members gain relative to acting on their own and continuing to emit. The size of such a coalition is determined by the marginal country that makes the coalition worthwhile, and what makes it self-enforcing is that without the marginal member it would fall apart. Under this framework a coalition of many countries could be viable, but the less there is to be gained the larger the coalition (Barrett, 1999 (Barrett, , 2003 , so from the point of view of making a difference the result is not radically different from the one obtained with non-linear cost functions.
Both approaches are, needless to say, highly stylized, and it is not easy to say which one is most realistic. Perhaps the winner is the "either or" approach; in the absence of cooperation no country, even a large one, is likely to do anything about its emissions, while emission reductions are likely to be quantitative commitments, albeit not total elimination, at any rate not in the initial stage.
Papers dealing with heterogeneous countries have done so within the framework of nonlinear abatement cost functions and found that size does not matter much (Barrett, 1997; Botteon and Carraro, 1997) . Asheim et al. (2006) is an exception, but is concerned with regions rather than individual countries, leaving open the question why countries form regions. The present paper investigates the importance of size difference in the "either or" case and finds that size could make a difference; the total level of abatement could be significantly greater if countries differ in size than if they are all equal.
Another dimension of the literature concerns whether the treaty is a one shot game or a dynamic one supported by trigger strategies. The one shot game model has three stages; first, countries decide whether or not to form a coalition; second, the coalition decides whether or not to reduce or cut emissions; third, non-coalition members decide what to do. Solving the game backwards, a critical number of countries forming a coalition is identified. The dynamic models look at whether defection from a treaty could be deterred by punishment strategies. Such strategies should be subgame-perfect and renegotiationproof in order to make a treaty self-enforcing. The Getting Even strategy employed by Barrett (1999) and Asheim et al. (2006) is subgame-perfect and weakly renegotiation proof and shown by Barrett to give the same result as the stage game, with identical number of countries. As shown below, the same happens in a model with countries of different size.
After formulating a simple model of emissions and abatement costs and benefits (next section), we analyze (Section 3) a stylized model of M large and N -M small countries, where the countries within each group are identical and show that this may result in considerably greater abatement than when all countries are identical. The following two sections examine whether the climate coalition thus found can be supported in a dynamic game by the grim versus the getting even strategy. In the penultimate section we look at possible climate coalitions in the real world; first with individual country gains from abatement proportional to emission levels, then with gains proportional to share in world GDP, and finally with gains proportional to size in terms of population. Gains proportional to size in terms of GDP is the case that comes closest to corresponding to which countries signed the Kyoto Protocol.
A MODEL OF EMISSIONS AND ABATEMENT BENEFITS
We assume N countries. Country i can either emit a fixed sum of greenhouse gases q i or not. The benefit (B) to each individual country from not emitting is (1)
where a i is the benefit for country i per unit of reduced emissions and c is the cost per unit of eliminating emissions, assumed equal for all countries. Reduced emissions are public goods, so each country benefits equally from all such reductions, irrespective of where they come from, but only pays the costs of eliminating its own emissions.
If a i < c for all i, all countries will emit in the absence of an agreement on emissions. We normalize the total volume of emissions to unity ( 1
) and assume , so that it would be profitable for the world as a whole to halt emissions.
When countries differ in size, they can be ordered so that
with strict inequality between at least some of the q's. Similarly, they can be ordered in terms of their a's. Both need not give the same ordering, but there is a tendency that a country with a large q will also have a large a. There are two reasons for this: populous countries will tend to have large emissions, and the benefits of reduced emissions must be summed over all individuals to get the country's a-value. Secondly, a country that is rich will have a large q, and as environmental values seem to be income-elastic it would also tend to have a high a-value. To begin with we shall simply assume that countries have the same ordering in terms of q and a and refer to countries with high values of aq as large countries. Barrett (1999 Barrett ( , 2003 analyzed international environmental treaties as self-enforcing strategies in a coalition game. The game has three stages:
A COALITION GAME WITH STYLIZED COUNTRY SIZE
Stage 2: The coalition decides whether or not to emit.
Stage 3: Outsiders decide individually whether or not to emit.
Assuming a i < c for all outsiders, they will emit in stage 3. In stage 2, coalition members (indexed by k) will not emit if
The critical stage is Stage 1, where a single player decides whether or not to join the coalition. The players are assumed to do so successively, so that the number who join the coalition is the smallest number K that makes ΣB k > 0. The incentive to join the coalition is stronger the larger the country.
Arranging the countries according to size, the coalition size K is determined by (d'Aspremont et al., 1983) :
while for the "first" outsider, we would have
because, by assumption, a K+1 < c. Unless a K+1 q K+1 is much less than a K q K , the first free rider will obtain greater benefits than the last member of the coalition, and in the case where all are identical, all free riders will obtain greater benefits than the members of the coalition.
When countries differ in size, it is obviously going to take a smaller number of countries (K) to form a coalition that satisfies the above condition. This should be an advantage; it is presumably easier to form a coalition among the few than among the many. But will this result in a greater abatement? This is less clear. When countries differ in size a few large countries will eliminate their emissions. With homogeneous counties there are more but smaller countries eliminating their emissions.
Consider an example where there are M large countries of equal size with a combined share M/(M+1) in total emissions and N -M small countries of equal size sharing the rest. With total emissions normalized at unity, the countries' emissions are
where l and s denote large versus small countries. If the a's differ in the same way as the emissions, we have
where a is the benefit of reducing emissions for the world as a whole, which we can set equal to one without loss of generality. With K ≤ M countries reducing emissions, we have the conditions for internal and external stability:
which, with a = 1, implies the smallest integer K > c(M+1). The more large countries we have, the more countries are needed to form a coalition. If all countries were equal, M = N -1, and we would have K > cN.
How large will the reduction in emissions be? In the case of a few large countries with a "fringe" of small ones, each large country will emit 1/(1+M) and the reduction in emissions will be K/(1+M) > c. With N countries of equal size, the reduction will be K/N > c. The critical value is in both cases c; emissions will be reduced by somewhat more than this. The difference will depend on the integer nature of K; there is a tendency that with a few large countries the reduction in emissions will be greater than with more, smaller countries. Figure 1 illustrates this, for two levels of abatement cost (c = 0.45 and c = 0.2, while a = 1 in both cases). In the high cost case the members of a coalition increase stepwise from 2 when there are only 2 large countries to 5 when there are 8, 9 or 10 large countries. The abatement when all countries are equal (thick line) and there are many of them is 45 percent. With only two large countries the abatement is two-thirds of total emissions, which is a handsome gain on 45 percent, but it falls quickly as the number of large countries increases, hovering between 50 and 60 percent, and falls to 45 percent when the number of large countries reaches 10. In the low cost case there are fewer countries in the abatement coalition and the total abatement is less than in the high cost case, a variation on the well known theme that coalitions become easier to attain the less is to be gained from doing so. Still, total abatement is greater than what would obtain when all countries are equal; when there are only four large countries abatement is twice what it would be when all countries are equal.
TRIGGER STRATEGY I: GRIM
If a cooperative solution has somehow been established, it can be maintained by a sufficiently low discount rate. Let the cooperative solution be limited to a coalition of K, as determined in the previous section. A member who breaks out of the coalition will be able to achieve gains by saving the costs of limiting emissions. Assume that he is found out after one period and that the coalition will fall apart when it finds out (the credibility of this strategy will be discussed below). The cooperative solution will be self-sustaining if
-1 is the discount factor, the LHS is the present value of the cooperative solution, and the RHS is the one period gain for member k from breaking out of the coalition. This expression can also be written as
Clearly, a small enough δ will violate this condition, while a high enough δ will ensure that it holds, as country k will only have joined the coalition if .
The threat of a breakdown of the coalition will only be credible if the members of the coalition would come out better by so doing than by preserving the rest of the coalition:
where m is a remaining member of the coalition and k, as above, is the member who defects. From this it follows that only the coalitions from the previous sections can be credibly supported by the trigger strategy. In analyzing the coalitions in the previous sections, a discount factor of unity was implicitly assumed. Allowing for time discounting, there is a critical discount rate for which the coalition can be credibly defended by the threat of breaking it up if one member defects, given by (7'). Figure 2 shows how the critical discount factor varies with the number of large countries in the stylized case above. For the case of only two countries the critical discount factor is quite low, only 0.35 in the high cost case, implying a discount rate of 1.86, and zero in the low cost case. As the number of large countries increases the critical discount factor rises quickly; for the case of 10 countries it is close to 1 (0.9875), implying the very low discount rate of 0.0127 in the high cost case. A coalition among a large number of identical countries would need the support of a near-zero discount rate. Note that the discount rate must be defined over a period of relevant length; i.e., a period long enough to detect a defection and to set in train the necessary response. This could be longer than a calendar year. If, for example, the necessary response time is two calendar years, a "reasonable" critical annual discount factor of 0.95 would translate into a reasonable factor of 0.9025. Hence, some of the critical discount factors in Figure 2 seem to be uncomfortably high. The reason why the critical discount factor in Figure 2 moves up and down is that as the number of large countries increases, the number of members in a coalition changes. As the number of large countries increases from 3 to 4 in the high cost case, an additional member is needed to make the coalition worth while. With more members in a coalition there is more to be lost by defecting, all else equal. As the number of large countries increases from 4 to 5, it still takes only 3 members to form a worthwhile coalition, and the fourth member would not find it worthwhile to join. But the critical discount factor increases from 0.625 to 0.85; each of the large countries is now responsible for less of the total emissions, and the 3 coalition members generate less reduction in emissions, which reduces the loss of leaving and destroying the coalition.
Perhaps the need for a climate coalition agreement to be supported by a realistic discount rate is not very relevant. Emission reduction would imply long term investment, either in abatement activities or in processes, especially energy production, that emit less greenhouse gases. The short term benefits from abandoning such efforts are probably small, and the time needed to discover that such efforts have been abandoned short.
TRIGGER STRATEGY II: GETTING EVEN
That the coalition will break down for the indefinite future as a result of one member leaving is a drastic assumption and unlikely to be in the remaining parties' best interest. This prompted Barrett (1999) to look at a less grim strategy, "getting even," also analyzed by Asheim et al. (2006) . Under this strategy, an agent who plays noncooperatively in one period is punished by all others playing non-cooperatively in the next period. After one period of non-cooperation the renegade reverts to the cooperative strategy, in order not to release a further punishment from the other players. After one period, the punishers revert to cooperation, and all can be envisaged to play cooperatively after that. The discount factor is set equal to one, as the punishment lasts only for one period, so that the discount factor will probably be close to one, but how close depends in fact on how long it will take to discover defection and to respond to it.
This strategy identifies both a lower and an upper critical size of the coalition (Asheim et al., 2006) . The lower critical size is determined by the requirement that it should not be in the interest of the renegade player to play non-cooperatively for more than one period. The upper critical size is determined by the requirement that the punishment strategy should be renegotiation-proof; that is, each punishing player should be better off by sticking to the punishment strategy than he would be if all the punishers continued to play cooperatively in what would otherwise be the punishment period, i.e., the period after the deviant player plays non-cooperatively.
Here we shall focus on the upper critical size of the climate coalition. The requirement that the punishment strategy be renegotiation-proof amounts to
where k is the deviating agent, who will be the only one abating in the punishment period under the getting even strategy, so what we have on the left hand side is the payoff from punishment while on the right hand side we have the payoff if no punishment takes place. This is both individually and collectively rational, because summing over all i's we get the collective benefit. Substituting from (5) we find
For comparison, if instead all countries are of equal size, we find
This gives exactly the same result as the static critical coalition game in Section 3.
A COALITION GAME WITH REAL WORLD COUNTRIES
The size of the world's countries is something we can observe, so from that point of view it may seem redundant to make stylized assumptions about this, whether countries are supposed to differ systematically in size, as above, or be equal, as is more usual. The point is, however, that in this context it is not clear what difference in size means, whether it is the emissions of greenhouse gasses or how reductions of emissions are valued. Both of these are important for what kind of solutions we may expect to get to the emission reductions game.
Suppose, first, that countries value emission reductions in proportion to their emission levels. In that case, a i = q i . If abatement costs are the same for all countries, the first country to abate, if the abatement cost is low enough, will be the one with the highest q i , which is the United States (cf. Table 1 ). This it will do if c < q i = 0.22. The remaining countries would be free riders. If c > 0.22 some other country would gain from joining the US and make a winning coalition. The country that stands to gain most from joining in that coalition is the one with the highest
, from which we can find that the critical cost for making this profitable is Table 2 .
From Table 2 we see that more countries join the climate coalition the higher the abatement cost is. China joins the US in a coalition if the abatement cost exceeds 0.22, then the EU, with Japan being the last one to join if the abatement cost exceeds 0.65. We may note that the total benefit achieved by the coalition rises until it consists of three members, but falls after that. This to a degree contradicts the result that climate coalitions become larger the smaller the benefit from forming such coalitions, because the benefits from free riding then become smaller. The difference is due to the unequal size of countries; bringing the large ones on board gives a disproportionate rise in total benefit, but Table 2 agrees with the established literature in that coalitions become larger the higher the abatement cost is. 4 The first country to abate, if it costs sufficiently little, would be the one that has the highest a. Then, if c were higher than max a i , the next country to join in a coalition would be the one with the next highest a i , for which we would find the critical cost as
, and so on. This produces the results in Table 3 . According to these results, the EU would be the first to abate, if the cost is low enough, due to its high valuation of abatement. If the abatement cost were too high to make this worthwhile, the United States would be the first country to join the EU in a coalition, and then Japan if the critical cost is still higher. The remaining large countries, Russia, China and India, would never join the climate coalition, owing to their low valuation of the emission reductions. This result certainly agrees better with what we observe; neither China nor India has shown much enthusiasm for joining an international climate convention, but the agreement with reality is not perfect; Russia joined the Kyoto Protocol while the United States did not. As above we see that the total benefit from the coalition increases up to a point as more countries join, despite a higher abatement cost. When the United States joins the EU the net benefits increase handsomely despite higher abatement costs, due to the size of emissions from the United States.
What if the valuation of benefits were the same per capita, so that the a i 's of individual countries would be proportional to their size in terms of population? Table 4 shows the share of the largest carbon dioxide emitters of world population. It is perhaps obvious that this would not be very conducive to climate coalitions; five of the most populous countries in the world are not among the largest emitters of greenhouse gases. In any case, China would have the strongest incentive to abate, and the critical cost for doing so is c = 0.2, which is not very high, but only India would have an incentive to form a coalition with China if the abatement cost is higher than this. Because both countries are responsible for only 23 percent of the carbon dioxide emissions, the emission reduction would be less than in most of the other cases. 
CONCLUSION
In a participation game with linear cost functions, differences in the size of countries do matter for the effectiveness of international environmental treaties. The self-enforcing treaty will consist of fewer countries, which would seem to be an advantage, as it is presumably easier to conclude a treaty the fewer countries that are involved. But we encounter the same strong free-riding incentives as in the case of many identical countries. The incentive to join the environmental treaty disappears as soon as the member which makes the treaty worth while has joined; all others would do better by free riding. The reason why the treaty would be more effective in the large country case lies in the integer character of countries; if a large country joins it will reduce the emissions by a large amount, while a small country will only reduce emissions by a small amount.
Applying the large versus small country approach to the world as we know it, it turns out to make a critical difference what "large" versus "small" means in terms of valuation of the benefits from reducing carbon dioxide emissions. If countries value the reductions in such emissions in proportion to their own emissions, we find that the United States should have taken the lead in forming an abatement coalition, to be joined by China, the European Union, Russia, India and Japan, in that order, according to how high the abatement cost is, with a higher abatement cost perversely leading to a greater coalition and more abatement. That notwithstanding, a higher abatement cost could in fact lead to greater total benefits from abatement, through bringing on board a large emitter.
Far from taking the lead in reducing carbon dioxide emissions, the United States has declined to sign the Kyoto Protocol. If we assume that countries' valuation of carbon dioxide emissions is proportional to their share of world GDP we conclude that the European Union would have the strongest interest in abatement, but we still find that the United States would be the first country to join the EU in a coalition, while Japan would come third. The two most populous countries in the world, China and India, would not be interested in joining that coalition, whatever the abatement cost. If on the other hand countries' valuation of emission reductions were in proportion to their share of world population, China would have the strongest incentive to abate, and would eventually be joined by India, but no other. This agrees with the suspicion that countries' valuations of emission reduction are strongly influenced by how rich they are.
